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For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the
Triumph and the Death of Adjudication
JUDITH RESNIK*

I.

FOR OWEN

Fiss

The title of this essay, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the
Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, is modeled on the title of
another essay - written in 1975 by Robert Cover and called For James
Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules.' I use Bob
Cover's words to invoke his presence, for it was Bob who brought me
together with Owen and forged the links that have become a severaldecade collaboration. 2 But my reference to the 1975 essay stems not
only from our emotional and intellectual engagement with Cover but
also from its relevancy. As many know from Moore's Federal Practice,3 James William Moore was a law professor at Yale who, along with
Charles Clark, helped to write4 and then to instruct us all about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 Cover's reference to Moore thus evokes
the great procedural reform project of the first half of the twentieth century in the United States - the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
* Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. © All rights reserved. My thanks to
Dennis E. Curtis, Vicki Jackson, and Mark Tushnet for thoughtful discussion of these issues, and
to Kirby Smith, Joseph Blocher, and Sara Sternberg for helpful research. Special thanks go to
Irwin Stotzky, who convened the conference that produced this volume and to the University of
Miami for its hospitality in welcoming us. As is evident from this essay, thanks are also owed to
Owen Fiss, with whom I have long had the pleasure of working and thinking, and to Robert
Cover, whose intellectual and personal companionship we both so enjoyed.
1. Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718 (1975).
2. See ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988); OWEN M.
Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE
(2003); JUDITH RESNIK, THE PROCESSES OF THE LAW: THE CHANGING ROLES OF AND FOR COURTS

(Foundation Press, 2004). See also ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE (1979).
3. JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1st ed. 1938);
JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (Daniel R. Coquillette, Gregory P. Joseph, Sol
Schreiber, Jerold S. Solovy & Georgene M. Vairo, eds., 3rd ed. 2003).
4. Charles Clark & William Moore, A New Federal Civil ProcedureI. The Background, 44
YALE L.J. 387 (1935) [hereinafter Clark & Moore, The Background]. Charles Clark & William
Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure H. Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291 (1935)
[hereinafter Clark & Moore, Pleadings and Parties].
5. William Moore, The Place of the New Federal Rules in the Law School Curriculum, 27
GEO. L.J. 884, 892 (1939).
6. In 1934, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate a nationwide set of rules.

See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
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Cover's essay - Reflections on Reading the Rules - began by
stating that:
we who think about procedure have become so transfixed by the
achievement of James Wm. Moore and his colleagues in creating,
nurturing, expounding and annotating a great trans-substantive code
of procedure that we often miss the persistent and inevitable tension
between procedure generalized across substantive lines and procedure applied to implement a particular substantive end. There are,
indeed, trans-substantive values which may be expressed . . . by a
code of procedure. But there are also demands of particular substantive objectives which cannot be served except through the purposeful
shaping, indeed the manipulation, of process to a case or to an area of
law.7
This analysis of the Federal Rules is another reason to begin by quoting
Robert Cover, for that trans-substantive procedural code is also key to
the work of Owen Fiss. The existence of a set of procedural practices
for federal judges is the central sociological fact that undergirds Owen's
work. The 1938 Federal Rules spanned the country, creating national
processes that united federal judges sitting thousands of miles apart by
imposing on them shared daily practices that promoted their identity as a
distinctive cadre of legal actors. The creation of the Federal Rules
helped to shape the persona of "the federal judiciary" with which Owen
Fiss is deeply engaged. The expansion of a federal lower court judiciary
during the first half of the twentieth century set the stage for a set of
judges - across the country - to develop bodies of law (including in
areas of special concern to Owen, such as anti-discrimination law) that
in turn have shaped expectations of adjudication in a way Owen believes
are vital to American social order.8
In another part of my title - Reflections on the Triumph and the
Death of Adjudication - I use a locution closer to the genre directly
associated with Owen Fiss. Owen consistently offers a clear plot line,
encapsulated in titles such as The Forms of Justice,9 or Against Settle-

U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)). Thereafter, the Court appointed a committee to do the drafting. See Order
Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935). In
1935, the Committee appointed by the Court to draft decided to create a uniform set of rules for
law and equity. See Clark & Moore, The Background, supra note 4, at 431-35, where they
encourage the adoption of a uniform set of rules, and Clark & Moore, Pleadings and Parties,
supra note 4, at 1292-99 (explaining the Court's decision). The Supreme Court then promulgated

the first set, to become effective in 1938. See Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
7. Cover, On Reading the Rules, supra note 1, at 718-721, 734.
8. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter,
Fiss, Forms of Justice].
9. Id.
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ment, 10 or Why the State?." But unlike Owen's broad declarative titles,
I offer a puzzle, for I have linked the "triumph of adjudication" to its
"death" and hence have muddied the waters. As I explain below,
Owen's aspiration for the substantive rationality and utility of adjudication has been challenged not only by the tensions that Bob Cover
described between trans-substantivity and procedure purposefully
modeled to substantive goals, but also by the failure of state-based adjudicatory processes to focus on and to develop broad constituencies supportive of their deployment for all kinds of claimants.
In this essay, I provide a rapid retrospective of some hundred years
of history of civil processes in the United States and (ever heroic, in
Owen's tradition) also refer to the world more generally, as a predicate
to exploring today's challenges, different from those on which Cover
focused twenty-five years ago. The question, then, was the permissibility of manipulating process to obtain outcomes, but the assumption,
then, was that a court-based procedural regime was itself durable.
Cover's concerns about ossification and formalism have, under the aegis
of a majority of five on the Supreme Court, proved justified in many
ways" - making plain the ongoing relevance of his insights.
Here, I argue that a different set of concerns needs to be explored
because of the current challenges to civil processes themselves. A conflict has emerged between judging as we understand it and systems of
dispute resolution that lack most of adjudication's values and attributes.
As Owen Fiss has many times insisted, adjudication is predicated on
public and disciplined fact-finding, licensing judges to impose regulatory obligations.' 3 The focus on the individual judge and the belief in
adjudication embraces the state as a central regulator of conduct. The
presumption is that transparent decision-making by state-empowered
judges can be controlled through judges obliged to invoke facts adduced
through a record, to give explanations, and to make available appellate
review. 4
10. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
11. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the
State?].

12. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999); Great-West Life Ins. & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). See generally
John Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court Trail of Errorin Russell,

Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317 (2003); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme
Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 343; Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The
Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L. REv. 223 (2003) [hereinafter
Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies].
13. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 8.
14. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning of

Article 111, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924, 1024-31 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error].
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But that view now has a serious competitor, committed to the utility of contract and looking to the participants to validate outcomes
through consensual agreements produced through processes sometimes
styled "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) and sometimes "dispute
resolution" (DR). Civil processes are one site of the struggle between
public and private governance and between state-based redistribution
efforts and market-focused mechanisms - between constitutionalism on
the hand, working through a regulatory state that relies in part on adjudication, and contract on the other, aimed at maximizing utility by reflecting preferences and tastes.'"
My purposes in this essay are threefold. First, I explain why the
familiar forms and functions of adjudication, engaged by Owen's jurisprudence, are not necessarily durable. Second, I hope to inscribe new
images of federal judges, no longer heroic solo actors but part of a corporate body that has begun to socialize the next generation of judges to
be suspicious of adjudication and to prefer negotiation. As I detail, the
management of today's federal judiciary uses its collective voice to lobby against Congress providing new federal rights and remedies if
enforced in federal court. Third, I demonstrate how, by cutting off
classes of litigants from high-profile adjudication by life-tenured federal
judges and sending these litigants to less public processes, policy
choices of both judges and lawyers have limited the development of
broad constituent support for adjudication.

II.

NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR ADJUDICATION

The expansion and contraction of adjudication are both framed by
the same developments, which made the prospect of adjudication plausible for whole new sets of claimants in the United States and beyond.
First, during the twentieth century, the state came to be understood as
itself subject to regulation, as bound by its own rules, as obliged to treat
persons with dignity and respect. Individuals gained the right to use
litigation to call state officials to account and to hold government to its
own promises. 16 Second, in part through new information technologies,
injuries experienced by large numbers of individuals, once seen as individualized and isolated events, became visible as patterns of connected
events. Third, the growth of the profession of lawyers provided the per15. See generally Judith Resnik, Civil Processes, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES
748-72 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
16. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity,
and Judicial Independence, 35 GEo. WASH. J. IrNr'L. L. & ECON. 521 (2003); James E. Pfander,
Government Accountability in Europe: A Comparative Assessment, 35 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
EcoN. 611 (2003); Judith Resnik & Julie Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
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sonnel to generate regulations and responses to aggregate forms of
17
injury.
A fourth factor, one that has been under-appreciated in the literature of courts, is women's rights. Women of all colors only gained
juridical voice in the last century, and the radical reconception of women
as rightsholders" 8 - both within and outside of their families - has
driven up the volume of disputes. One illustration: The highest demand
on civil legal aid funds in England has come from disputes related to
family life. 19 When one adds women to other groups (some denominated by race, ethnicity or class and others by age or social and economic status, and including those women who share these multiple
markers of identity), one finds new definitions of what kinds of rights
are needed and what constitutes justice.
Adjudication's "triumph" and its "death" are interrelated outcomes
of a century of developments. Below, for narrative clarity, I abstract one
from the other.
A.

Adjudication's Triumph

Take the changes in conceptions of the persons eligible to hold
rights, new understandings of the obligations of the state, and changing
technologies, and reflect on a sequence of events supporting a narrative
of changes in the United States that I have styled "The Triumph of Adjudication." Return to the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
which I began. Their drafters created a trans-substantive code to simplify process, to ease access to courts, and to collapse distinctions
between law and equity. With their flexible, equity-based approach to
diminish formalism,2" these rules put trial judges front and center and
17. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILLIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW
(1995); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002); Judith Resnik, Reconstructing
Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393
(2002); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for
Transformation, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 345 (2002); Vicki C. Jackson, Gender and
Transnational Discourse, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002).
19. See Tamara Goriely, Making the Welfare State Work: Changing Conceptions of Legal
Remedies Within the British Welfare State, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID:
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES

108 (Francis Regan, Alan Paterson, Tamara Goriely &

Don Fleming. eds., 1999); Anne Owers, Public Provision of Legal Services in the United
Kingdom: A New Dawn?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 143, 158 n.8 (2000).

20. The new rules relaxed pleading requirements but imposed obligations on adversaries to
exchange information - both written and oral - about the facts and law in dispute. The concept
of lawyers and judges meeting (the "pre-trial") was borrowed from practices of state courts and
the English system, whereas the mandated disclosure of information ("discovery," accomplished
through interrogatories, in-person depositions, production of documents, examination of physical
evidence, and admissions) was largely an invention of the 1938 Rules. See generally Stephen N.
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endowed them with a good deal of discretion to tailor processes to the
circumstances of a particular case.

Moreover, encoded in my phrase, "The Triumph of Adjudication,"
and in the very existence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
decisions about the allocation of responsibility between judges and Congress in elaborating rights. Recall that during the early part of the twentieth century, a struggle ensued in the United States between a growing
national bar and some populist members of Congress who were leery of
decision-making in Washington."' Remember that, around 1900, the

federal judiciary itself was small, numbering under 100.22 But the
national lawyers won. In 1922, Congress began what became a great
23
expansion project, adding to the ranks of life-tenured federal judges,
who today number more than 1,000.24 In 1934, Congress gave power to
the Supreme Court to promulgate federal rules - thereby displacing and
replacing local practice with national norms.2 5 One rationale was technocratic and managerial. Judges turned to the language of business, to
26
make their processes more efficient and modern.
References to efficiency alone are insufficient to capture all of the
agendas. In the wake of the Depression, many saw federal governance
as a necessary and as a desirable response to political and economic

conditions. An expansion of federal jurisdiction was a mechanism by
which to spread and to enforce a national legal regime. In the 1940s, the
Civil Rights Movement turned to the federal courts, and by the Warren
era, constitutional interpretation looked favorably upon court-based
processes to enable racial equality and to enhance human dignity. Congress not only supported but also expanded this project, time and again
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1987); Stephen Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The
Supreme Court, Federal Rules, and Common Law, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (1988); Stephen
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
21. See Subrin, supra note 20, at 943-45, 955 (discussing the conflict).
22. See Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the Federal District
Courts for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 612-13 (2002) [hereinafter
Resnik, Inventing the District Courts].
23. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, 42 Stat. 837, 837-838 (creating 24 new
judgeships). The Act also created the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, the forerunner of what
is now called the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. at 838 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 331 (2000)).
24. See Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 22, at 614-22.
25. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. 2072 (1994)).
26. For example, in the 1960s and thereafter, federal courts also adopted individual calendar
systems so that a judge assigned at the outset of a case would have responsibility for it from filing
to disposition, thereby enhancing judicial authority over its processing. See Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 395-402 (1982). See also Resnik, Trial as Error,
supra note 14, at 946-47.
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authorizing government officials and private parties to bring lawsuits as
a means of enforcing federal law.2 7 In short, federal procedure was a
piece of a larger constitutional project.2 8
The story would be too narrow were it only focused on civil litigation. Consider also the overhaul of criminal litigation. The procedural
requirement of a "right to counsel ' 29 that had sat substantively vacant in
the United States Constitution for almost two hundred years was suddenly given new meaning. The Constitution was read to mandate equipage, to insist on state subsidies for criminal defendants and federal
rights to process. Gideon v. Wainwright" and Brady v. Maryland3 '
required that indigent criminal defendants be provided with state-paid
lawyers, who (in theory) were to be accorded respect, some flexibility,
and information by prosecutors. This interpretation of the Constitution
was a part of the Supreme Court's insight that some states had used their
criminal justice systems to enforce views of racial inequality, 32 just as
the contemporary refusal to intervene bespeaks a narrowed vision of the
constitutional obligation to create equality.3 3
And, then, the idea shaped in the criminal context that individuals
ought to be empowered and equipped in the contest with the state
migrated to the civil side. The Supreme Court - borrowing Professor
Charles Reich's insight that statutory entitlements were forms of "property" to be protected from state deprivation by "due process of law ' 34 required that final decision-making about government entitlements
employ judicial modes of process to ensure fairness. Goldberg v.
Kelly35 is the obvious shorthand here, as during the 1960s and 1970s the
template for adjudication provided by the Federal Rules was applied in
some respects to the administrative context.
Other types of civil litigation started to look different in light of an
understanding of the obligation to equip litigants and to welcome them
27. For example, between 1974 and 1998, the Congress created more than 470 new federal
causes of action. Resnik, Trial as Error,supra note 14, at 956 (citing a memorandum with this
data that was drafted by staff at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
28. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?,58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003).
29. U.S. CONST., amend V1.

30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
32. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
33. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
34. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
35. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This case, and the litigation materials from its record, are
reproduced in the first chapter of COVER, Fiss & RESNIK, supra note 2, and in Fiss & RESNIK,
supra note 2. See generally Judith Resnik, The Story of Goldberg: Why This Case Is Our

Shorthand,in CIVIL
CASES

PROCEDURE STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE LEADING CIVIL PROCEDURE

(Kevin M. Clermont ed., Foundation Press, forthcoming 2004).
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as rights-seekers. The project was not confined to conflict with the state,
for the goals were broader: to facilitate the ability to pursue rights when
disputing others. Access fees to courts were modified, mostly by statute.36 The Legal Services Corporation was created,37 and the United

States Constitution was read to require that a very small sliver of indigent civil litigants - parents faced with state efforts to terminate their
circumstances, to be
right to be a legal parent - were, under certain
38
state.
the
by
paid
were
who
lawyers
provided
Aggregate processing became another vehicle by which to enhance
access. Class actions generate subsidies for litigants by relying on economies of scale to get a small cadre of lawyers to serve a wider set of
claimants.3 9 In the 1960s, the Federal Rules were modified to facilitate
large-scale litigation. That new class action rule, complemented by statutes authorizing consolidation across federal district courts, n0 reshaped
our imagination about what litigation might accomplish. 4 ' Proceedings
with hundreds and thousands of individuals, some in search of institu-

tional reform and some in search of money, became more commonplace.
These mega cases soon overshadowed - in the press, in popular
imagery, and in law schools - the small value social security claimant,
pitted against a sole adversary, even when that adversary was the state.
In this story trumpeting the "Triumph of Adjudication," markers of
success include congressional creation of new federal rights and the fil-

ing of more cases. The legislature embraced adjudication by authorizing
litigants to bring a widening array of lawsuits aimed at enforcing civil
36. Constitutional obligations to require fee waivers were imposed in only limited areas. See
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), as narrowed by Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973) and Kras v. United States, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). Statutory provisions can be found at 28
U.S.C. § 1915, which was narrowed as amended in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
104-134, § 804, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Congressional authorization for fee waivers dated back to
the act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252, which provided that any poor "citizen" could
commence or prosecute a claim without paying fees. See John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and
Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923). Legislation made such provisions available to
appellate litigation. See Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 113, 40 Stat. 634, 683.
37. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)) (amended by Pub. L. No. 95-222, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1998)).
38. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See also M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102 (1996) (requiring the state to provide transcripts to enable appellate review when
such parents could not afford to pay for them).
39. See generally Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 2119 (2000).
40. Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)) (first enacted in 1968).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1966). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the
Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996); Judith Resnik, From Cases to Litigation, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

5 (1991).
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rights, environmental rights, consumers' rights, workers' rights.
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, caseloads within the federal system
tripled, as hundreds of new statutory causes of action were enacted.4 2
That demand soon outstripped the life-tenured judiciary, even as Congress was greatly augmenting its ranks. Life-tenured judges worked in
tandem with Congress to manufacture non-life-tenured auxiliary judges,
magistrate and bankruptcy judges, administrative law judges, hearing
officers, and the like, all of whom today comprise a workforce of some
4000 federal adjudicators committed to this national project.4 3
Moreover, this discussion ought not remain parochial, focused
solely on the United States. 44 Relevant evidence of the embrace of adjudication comes from covenants promulgated through the United Nations,
announcing rights to fair and public hearings to protect equality before

the law and putting the judiciary and judicial independence at the fore.
In 1985, the United Nations issued twenty "basic principles on the independence of the judiciary" to underscore both the import of judges and

the need to secure their protection against the very governments that
deploy them.4 5 The packet includes guarantees on judicial terms of service, powers of finality, and mechanisms to ensure autonomy. Procedures for "effective implementation" followed, including the
deployment of a special rapporteur to monitor and to assess compliance.4 6 Yearly reports have been produced, addressing corruption,
accountability, and independence. Other transnational documents and
42. Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 22, at 649.
43. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983),
[hereinafter Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary];Patrick Higginbotham, Bureaucracy The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261 (1980); Patricia Wald, The
Problem With the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD.
L. REV. 766 (1983).
44. Indeed, a signature of Owen Fiss's activism has been his efforts to move this
constitutional adjudicatory project to the Southern hemisphere and the Middle East. See Irwin P.
Stotzky, The Indispensable State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201 (2003).
45. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, UN Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev. 1,
at 59 (1985), available at http://www.umn.edui/humanrts/instree/i5bpij.htm, a declaration adopted
at the 1985 Milan conference and later approved by the UN General Assembly, GA Res. 40/32
(Nov. 29, 1985) and 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), reprinted in CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, I HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS pt. 1, 386 (1994),

For example,

Article 5 provides: "Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using
established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal
process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial
tribunals." The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS
17 1) creates rights to judicial processes as substantive requirements.
46. In April 1994, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special
Rapporteur, Param Cumaraswamy of Malaysia, to help bring attention to the relevant guidelines
and conventions related to judicial autonomy and to the treatment of jurors, lawyers and prisoners.
See Independence of the Judiciary: A Human Rights Priority (UN Dep't of Pub. Info. 1996), at
http://www.un.org/rights/dpi 1837e.htm.
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individual countries have announced understandings - predicated upon
a mixture of constitutional and natural law - of a judiciary's rights to
independence,4 7 sometimes secured by financing and sometimes by set
terms of office not controlled by the government in power.48 And in
these last few decades, we have seen a willingness of judges to exercise
universal jurisdiction, in the sense of using domestic legal power to take
jurisdiction over wrongs outside a country's borders.4 9 Further, in the
spring of 2003, the International Criminal Court opened its doors, joining a few other transnational courts. On the private law side, efforts
coordinated through the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT have
produced a draft "transnational code of civil procedure."5 ° The proponents of adjudication, focused on the state and relying on the personage
of the professional judge, sometimes working in conjunction with lay
judges or with juries, and empowered to generate remedies, could well
claim victory as that model of decision-making can be found around the
world.5 '
47. See, e.g.,
INDEPENDENCE

EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL
(2001), available at http://www.eumap.org/

OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING THE

IN THE

EU

reports/content/20. See also

ACCESSION

PROCESS

THE WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT

MANUAL

(2002), available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/1jrmanualLowres.

pdf; THE

WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND

JUDICIAL

APPROACH OF THE LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY

REFORM:

OBSERVATIONS,

EXPERIENCES,

AND

(2002), available at http://www4.worldbank.org/

legal/publications/ljrobservations-final.pdf; THE WORLD BANK, ARGENTINA: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
SECTOR ASSESSMENT
(2001), available at http://www4.worldbank.org/lega/publications/
argentina-final.pdf. See generally Maria Dakolias, Legal and JudicialDevelopment: The Role of
Civil Society in the Reform Process, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. S26 (2000).
48. See e.g., Reference to the Public Sector Pay Reduction Act, P.E.I., 150 D.L.R. 4th 577,
692-93 (Can. 1997) (holding that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that
salaries of provincial court judges be protected from political manipulation); Starrs v. Ruxton,
2000 J.C. 208, 226 (H.C.J. 1999) (interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights
provision in Art. 6, para. 1, of rights to public hearings before an independent tribunal, and other
materials to hold that temporary judges on the Sheriff Court of Scotland, were not permitted. Cf
Clancy v. Caird, 2000 Sess. Cas. 441 (Sess. 2000) upholding other judgeships appointed by judges
rather than prosecutors.
49. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (2003); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980); R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate et al, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 2 All
E.R. 97 (H.L. 1999). See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 311 (2002).
50. See generally Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of
Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Some German and Swiss Reactions to the HazardTaruffo Project, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463 (1998).
51. The shift is sometimes accompanied by concerns. Phrases like "juridification" and
"government by judiciary" are marked by a critique that democracies should not entrust too many
decisions to adjudicatory processes. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicialization of
Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 191 (2002); Ran Hirschl, The
Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four
ConstitutionalRevolutions, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 91 (2000).
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Adjudication's Collapse

But not everyone has been happy with these developments, and
thus I turn to the nature and the sources of discontent. Reconsider the
last one hundred years by thinking about how frequently the word "crisis" is used in conjunction with justice systems around the world.5 2 A
host of complaints are leveled at the expansion of and the reliance on
adjudication.
One complaint is that the adversary model itself is a form of "junk
science, '5 3 relying on biased information produced by parties, ignoring
or exploiting cognitive biases, and resulting in suspect decisions. Such
critics claim that adversary trials require extravagant investments of
resources to yield flawed states of knowledge. A related objection
argues that adjudication (especially in the United States) provides too
much by way of opportunities for process, enabling strategic opponents
to engage in manipulations that work to the detriment of their adversaries and the public.54
These critics regard twentieth century aspirations for lawyer-based
production of information as simplistic, superseded, or wrong. For
example, rules of discovery, crafted before photocopying and computers
were commonplace, did not envision the massive amounts of information that could be generated, stored, or hidden. Such rules have provided incentives for profits that lawyers garner from production and
obfuscation and may well have played a role in restructuring the legal
profession, now dominated by large law firms dependant on hourly billing.5 Similarly, through revisions of class action and other aggregation
rules, capacity was enhanced to group similarly-situated individuals
together. The hope was that such collectives could be adequately represented by a single lawyer or through small numbers of self-elected or
designated advocates. But large groups may also have diverse or con52. See,

e.g.,

ADRIAN

A.S.

ZUCKERMAN,

CIVIL

JUSTICE

IN

CRISIS:

COMPARATIVE

(1999); ESSAYS ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Adrian A.S.
Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995).
53. This term has gained currency as critics claim that allegations by plaintiffs of harms
caused by products or substances are based on a lack of high-quality scientific knowledge. See,
e.g., PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). Others argue
that the claim of "junk science" is itself a strategic attempt to insulate defendants from liability for
their failures to protect consumers from such hazards.
PERSPECTIVES

ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

54. See, e.g., John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.

CHI.

L.

REV.

823 (1985).
55. George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly

Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (arguing that revisions of procedural rules, and specifically the
introduction of discovery by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, created the conditions for
the emergence of hourly billing). See also Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Teaching Billing:
Metrics of Value in Law Firms and Law Schools, 54
DEBORAH

L.

STAN.

L. REv. 1409 (2002). See generally

RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION

(2000).
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flicting goals, and the strategic behavior of attorneys for plaintiffs, coupled with defendants in search of "global peace," sometimes yields
judgments protecting both sets of interests at the expense of many of the
injured and of the public.5 6
Another set of complaints are more technocratic, fastening on
problems of sloppiness, inattention, ineptitude, inexperience, and misuse, caused by lawyers with a range of motives and skills and engaged in

strategic interaction. Some of the spokespersons for this position are
judges, who have come to argue that, as the pre-trial process provided
multiple opportunities for adversarial exchange, judicial oversight was
needed to monitor attorneys. 57 Yet others have a different kind of complaint, seeing adjudication as unduly formalistic and therefore as impoverished in its lack of humanity. Arguing for more user-friendly, less
adversarial processes, posited as capable of producing more useful
remediation, these critics want to re-center process on the disputants'
voices and goals. They object to the degree of dependence on lawyers,
which, they say, results in adversary adjudicatory processes that depersonalize, objectify, and distance claimants. 58 This wing of the ADR
movement stresses reliance on processes such as mediation and arbitration and argues that such procedures are more generative than adjudication. Illustrative is the name - "Just Resolutions" - chosen by the
American Bar Association's Section on ADR for its newsletter.5 9
A different kind of objection, intuitively friendlier to adjudication,
56. See Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked': Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
REV. 1925 (2002). See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER,
NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK K.
MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); John
Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John Coffee, Commentary Conflicts, Consent, and
Allocation After Amchem Products - Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their
Clients' Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541 (1998); John Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Susan Koniak & George Cohen, Under Cloak
of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996).
57. See, e.g., Robert Peckham, The Federal Judges as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Casefrom Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
58. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV.
754 (1984); see generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS ,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (3rd ed. 1999). But see
E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia A. Eberner, William L.F. Felstiner, Deborah R.
Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of
their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Soc'y REV. 953 (1990) (describing an
empirical study of litigants who found both arbitration and adjudication to be dignifying of their
concerns and who reported themselves as feeling some control over those processes).
59. See, e.g., JUST RESOLUTIONS (Newsletter of the American Bar Association Section of
Dispute Resolution), Jan. 2003.

Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L.
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is angered by adjudication's failure to make good on its own promises.
The adversary model assumes a relative equality of combatants who
have the wherewithal to engage in combat. Given the centrality of lawyers and other repeat players to adversarial processing, large segments
of the middle class - let alone the poor - are precluded from turning
to process because of its costs.6" Even in the arena of constitutionally
mandated criminal defense services, legislative funding does not meet
documented needs. Horrid examples - such as lawyers who do not
investigate evidence in advance of murder trials, or who represent a victim and then an assailant, or who sleep while the case is ongoing in front
of the jury - populate the case law about "ineffective assistance of
counsel," which tolerates some of these very failings. 6 ' On the civil
side, well-heeled opponents have succeeded in convincing Congress to
limit funding and to impose severe restrictions on lawyers for the poor.62
Similarly, courts have narrowed fee-shifting rights, have refused to compensate attorneys for the risk of taking contingent claims,6 3 and have
curbed access enabled through class actions. 64
The denouement is that these divergent critiques have, over the past
forty years, worked significant changes in the rules, doctrine, and
processes of courts, both domestically and transnationally, as the antiadjudication movement has succeeded in several respects. The 1938
Rules have been substantially amended to direct judges to promote alternative dispute resolution. 65 Congress has written new statutes to authorize court-annexed arbitration programs 6 6 and has mandated the use of
ADR in agencies as well as in courts.67 Institutions supporting ADR
have proliferated, convening conferences (on topics such as "Court
60. See generally HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE Do AND THINK ABotrr
GOING TO LAW (1999); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
61. See generally Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
62. See Act of Ap. 26., 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 504(a), I10 Stat. 1321 (1999); 45 C.F.R.
1612 (1999); See generally The Future of Legal Services: The Arthur Liman Colloquium Papers,
17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 281 (1998).

63. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598 (2001); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
64. Rulings limiting class actions and perceptions that the federal courts are unwelcoming of
class actions has fueled some to seek to increase federal jurisdiction over class actions. See
Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism:The Implications of the New Federalism
Decisions on Mass Tort Case and Other Complex Litigation, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1564

(2000) (discussing then-pending legislation, styled "The Class Action Fairness Act," to limit state
court powers).
65. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16 as amended by the 1993 amendments.
66. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993
(1998), (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000)).
67. Id.
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ADR"), proffering services (from firms with names such as "EndDispute" or "JAMS" - Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 69Services, Inc.),
68
teaching law school classes, and shaping model rules.
Moreover, just as the expansion of civil processes did not stem
exclusively from within the domain of rules, so the efforts at constriction
have not come solely through revision of civil processes. Bodies of substantive law - tort, contract, consumer, environmental, civil rights are also means by which to alter civil processes. 70 As I wrote this essay,
newspapers headlined congressional efforts to limit medical malpractice
litigation.7 1 Rules on liability and remedy have been narrowed across a
range of subject matters.7 2

Clarification of the different modes of limiting adjudication's reach
is required, as different kinds of alternatives exist. One prominent form
is court-based ADR,73 creating a "new" civil procedure. Techniques
such as mediation, arbitration, and settlement conferences - once
termed "extrajudicial" 74 - have become regular features of civil
68. Several casebooks are now available. See, e.g., LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN &
RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE (2000); LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN,
LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK (1994); EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURT (Frank E.A. Sander ed., 1991); GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 58; KATHERINE
VAN

WEZEL STONE,

ARBITRATION

LAW

(2003);

KATHERINE

VAN

WEZEL

STONE,

PRIVATE

(2000).
69. See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2001). The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Mediation Act has approved and recommended the Act for
enactment in all the states as of August 2001. See National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Mediation Act, at http://www.nccusl.org. As of this writing, the UMA has
not been enacted.
70. See, e.g., the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §l(a)(5), 114
Stat. 2763 (1995), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. III 1997); Prison Litigation Reform Act Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 801, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 1997).
71. See, e.g., House Acts to Limit Malpractice Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at Al;
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Democrat Pulls Her Support ForSenate MalpracticeBill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2003, at A2 1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Plan to Curb MalpracticeAwards Advances to Full
House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at A21.
72. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that alleged violations of a
federal statute protecting student privacy did not give rise to a private action for damages);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to
Title VI were not enforceable by private litigants). See generally Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies,
supra note 12, at 231-71.
73. See generally Wayne D. Brazil & Jennifer Smith, Choice of Structures: Critical Values
and ConcernsShould Guide Format in CourtADR Programs, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 8;
Wayne D. Brazil, CourtADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 93 (2002); Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation about the Current
Status and the Future of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. oF DIsp. RESOL. 1 [hereinafter,
Brazil, A View From the Courts]; Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of
JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 715

(1999).
74. The word "extrajudicial" was used in 1983 in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) to refer to such
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processes. Through rule changes, training and educational programs, the
definition of the "good judge" became a judge focused on and able to
achieve dispositions with as low an investment of time as possible.
What is judicial (and judicious) is no longer equated with adjudication,
with public processes, with reasoned deliberation. This shift is also
affecting the appellate process.7 5
Another form of ADR is external to but also dependent on courts.
Judicial doctrine enforced obligations to pursue resolutions outside
courts. Of course, organized alternatives to courts predate the twentieth
century. While the full history of dispute resolution has yet to be written, we know that various trade groups as well as some religious and
ethnic communities have long provided their own stylized dispute resolution processes for conflicts arising inside self-contained communities.7 6 But the law had been ambivalent about them, as judges guarded
their own monopoly power and regularly refused to enforce contracts to

arbitrate.
During the twentieth century, legislators and court-based adjudicators shifted their attitudes towards their competitors. In 1925, Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), recognizing arbitration contracts to be enforceable obligations. 77 In 1946, Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), relying heavily on agency-based

processes. The rule then stated that the purposes of a pretrial conference included consideration of
"the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." The
Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules- 1983 Amendment then explained that the reference
was to "exploring the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute." See
Fed.R.Civ.P.16(c) and accompanying Notes, in 28 U.S.C. App. Rule 16 (1982 ed., Supp. I, Jan.
15, 1093-Jan. 22, 1984).
In 1993, the rule was again amended and the term "extrajudicial procedures" was deleted. As
the Notes to the 1993 amendments explained, their purposes were to
describe more accurately the various procedures that, in addition to traditional
settlement conferences, may be helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot
immediately be settled, the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of
alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral
evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that can lead to consensual resolution of the
dispute without a full trial on the merits. The rule acknowledges the presence of
statutes and local rules or plans that may authorize use of some of these procedures
even when not agreed to by the parties.
See Note to subdivision (b), paragraph 9, 1993 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
75. See William Reynolds & William Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996).
76. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 132-33 (1992). See also ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHouT LAW (1991).

77. See Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)).
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hearings as an alternative to adjudication.7 8 Yet federal courts retained
oversight in a variety of ways. As to adjudication within agencies, such
decisions often required enforcement through the courts or could be
challenged in and reviewed by the courts. As to contracts to arbitrate,
judges declined to enforce such agreements if entered into before conflicts arose and if waiving enforcement of federal rights in federal
courts. Judges objected, seeing arbitration as too flexible, too lawless,
too informal. They contrasted it with adjudication, praised for its regulatory role in monitoring adherence to national norms.79
However, by the last decades of the twentieth century, the federal
courts had embraced alternatives both from within and from without. In
the 1980s, the Supreme Court upheld broad grants of authority to agencies and arbitrators for adjudication, and the Court reversed earlier rulings and enforced arbitration contracts, even when federal statutory
rights were at stake.8 0 Instead of objecting to the informality of arbitration, judges praised its flexibility. Importantly, judges also argued that
arbitration was similar to adjudication, now reconfigured as just one of
several techniques appropriate for resolution of disputes. More generally, judges and lawyers celebrate dispute resolution premised on parties' negotiation by assuming that parties possess the requisite
information and can, at lower costs, obtain appropriate resolutions.
Today, law increasingly sends contracting parties, such as employees and consumers, to mandatory arbitration programs created by
employers, manufacturers, and providers of goods and services.8" Concepts of "rights to sue" have given way to enforcing obligations to use
alternatives, many of which do not permit aggregate processing and do
not require public disclosure of the decisions rendered.8 2 Turning to
trial rates, and holding aside the complexity of measurement for the
78. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
79. See, e.g, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See generally, Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors?Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
211 (1995).
80. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (both relating to adjudicatory
processes in agencies or through arbitration); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (both upholding
ex ante arbitration agreements as sufficient to vindicate federal statutory rights).
81. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), Green Tree Fin. Corp.
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). See also Linda Demaine & Deborah Hensler, Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer Contracts: The "Average Joe's" Experience (forthcoming 2004; manuscript
on file with the author).
82. The obligations of processes substituted for court are not yet clear. See id. Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 92 (placing the burden on opponents of arbitration to show that its costs, as
contrasted with those of adjudication, undermine an alternative dispute process's utility as a forum
in which one can vindicate federal statutory rights); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct.
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moment, the decline has been impressive. Soon after the federal rules
were launched, about fifteen percent of cases ended with a trial.83 Sixty
years later, fewer than three percent did.84 Yet, even those few trials
prompt criticism, for trials are "failures" in a system geared to producing
settlements.8"
These developments are not limited to the United States.8 6 To use
England as one example, a 1996 report, "Access to Justice"8 7 (often
referred to as the "Woolf Report" after Harry Woolf, its author and now
the Lord Chief Justice) concluded that the time had come to curb adversarialism by limiting lawyers' options, by calling for increased use of
ADR, by focusing on settlement, and by giving greater authority to
judges to manage cases. The 1996 report sought to have lawyers "front
load work" through requirements that they undertake efforts, before filing, to reach agreements with opponents.88 The report urged that judges
be given managerial powers to help them to make the costs of proceedings "proportionate" to the amount at stake. 89 To do so, the report called
for detailed "protocols" (to be developed through bench/bar committees)
for different kinds of cases, which in turn would be assigned to "tracks"
(with proposed time tables) depending on their anticipated complexity. 90
The Woolf Report also sought to empower judges to police compliance
and to sanction misbehavior by authorizing judges to alter the allocation
of costs at the dispute's conclusion based on assessments of the reasonableness of positions taken during proceedings. In 1999, new rules
became effective in England and Wales that detail pre-action procedures
(requiring claimants to serve demands on opponents, who must investi2402 (2003) (requiring that the question of whether arbitration contracts preclude class actions is
one to be decided initially by the arbitrator rather than by the courts).
83. See Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994
Wisc. L. REv. 631, 633 (1994).
84. See Patrick Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV.
1405, 1409-13 (2002). In light of this change, the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association has created a project, The Vanishing Trial, to obtain and to assess the data. See Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts (preliminary version, Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/
taskforces/cji/nosearch/home.html. See also Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of
Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U. SAN. FRANCISCO L. REV. 17
(2003).
85. See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 14, at 925-26 (describing case law and
commentary preferring settlements to trials).
86. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR Without Borders, LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES, Fall/
Winter 2003, at 77.

87. HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996). See also Lord Harry Woolf, Civil Justice
in the United Kingdom, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (1997).
88. Id. at 107-15.
89. Id. at 46-47.
90. Id. at 20-71.
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gate and reply) and three tracks ("small claims," "fast," and "multitrack").9 1 And there, like here, revisions are also underway to limit
access to appeal.9 2 Similarly, international and regional treaties, some
related to human rights and others focused on commercial transactions,
also often turn to arbitration or settlement-focused processes.9 3
As a consequence, we now face a tension quite different from the
one invoked by Bob Cover, who focused three decades ago on the desirability of uniformity of procedure as contrasted with particularization
and variation in procedural rights to respond to demands for substantive
justice.9 4 As he explained, trans-substantive rules may ignore distinctions among kinds of litigants and of claims. Cover's questioning
proved prophetic, for the aspiration for trans-substantive uniformity of
the 1938 Rules has (in many instances) been rejected, but not always (as
he had proposed) to seek greater access to justice and more just results.
Rather, content-specific regimes have been created through amendments
made by the judiciary (placing additional burdens on certain kinds of
litigants, such as prisoners), through local rulemaking by individual districts, and by Congress, requiring that claimants under particular legal
regimes use special processes.9 5 Further, the national federal procedural
rules themselves have also been revised to focus parties on conclusions
without adjudication. Moreover, through doctrinal developments, one
can be read out of court on the basis of signing a boilerplate provision in
a form contract or in a job application9 6 or because of forms accompany91. These proposals have occasioned a good deal of debate. See generally MICHAEL ZANDER,
(2000); ROGER SMITH, JUSTICE: REDRESSING THE BALANCE (Legal Action
Group, 1997)]; Michael Zander, The Woolf Report: Forwards or Backwards for the New Lord
Chancellor? 16 CIvIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 208; The Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf, M.R., Medics,
Lawyers, and the Courts, 16 CIvIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 302 (1997)' Adrian A.S. Zuckerman,
Lord Woolf s Access to Justice: Plus ca Change .... 59 MODERN L. REV. 773 (1996).
92. In the late 1990s, a committee filed its report on civil appellate procedures. Like the
Woolf Reforms, this group saw the problems as expense, delay, and complexity, and focused on
responses to enhance efficiency. The report raised concerns about rising numbers of appeals and
too lenient grants of leave for appeal. Opining that there should be "no automatic right of appeal,"
the report called for a change in culture through court management, the creation of a fast track for
certain appeals, and extension of the requirement for leave to appeal - all to result in process
deemed proportionate to the scope of a given controversy. See JEFFREY BOWMAN, REPORT ON
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION), REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Sept. 1997).
93. See generally MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
THE STATE OF JUSTICE

2001

COMPANION VOLUME TO THE SECOND EDITION

(2001);

JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE

(2002).
94. See Cover, On Reading the Rules, supra note 1.
95. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003).
96. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that, while signing a
form job application can bar individuals from pursuing discrimination claims, the EEOC has an
independent cause of action, created by statute, and is not barred); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (enforcing an arbitration agreement that precluded the employee
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION

from pursuing state-based anti-discrimination claims).
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ing the purchase of a computer or a cell phone.9 7
Through these developments, a third mode of civil processing has
come into being that melds aspects of privately-based dispute resolution
with the public processes. As described above, adjudication has never
been the sole or the dominant means of conflict resolution; communities
and trade groups shaped many means of dealing with conflict other than
going to court. But during the last forty years, the state itself has
embraced such private dispute resolution models as appropriate for a
wide array of conflicts. Governments now insist that many litigants who
come to court use non-adjudicatory mechanisms that resemble private
dispute resolution but stem from state-based rules of process (rather than
from disputants' contractual agreements) and that include not only disputants with preexisting and ongoing relationships but also strangers.9 8
The development of this "third way" could be assimilated into a
story heralding the triumph of adjudication, but it could also be used as a
marker of adjudication's decline. The legalization of private processes
brings with it professional domination and greater complexity, making
these processes mimic adjudication and collapse into it. Moreover, the
contemporary multiplication of adjudicatory-like proceedings could be
evidence of the success of twentieth century reforms. Civil processes relying on individual entrepreneurialism to enforce public norms opened courthouses to individuals formerly excluded. The legal profession, when pressed, also began to admit those (of all colors and both
sexes) whom it had previously prevented from gaining membership. 99
Rising demands prompted the invention of whole new sets of judges and
processes - a proliferation of the juridical form that includes all the
forms of ADR. Yet, at the same time, the turn to ADR - in both U.S.
domestic institutions, in other countries' courts, and in global agreements - also represents the privatization of public processes, the diminution of transparency, and the decline of regulation.
Ill.

RECONCEIVING THE ADJUDICATORY PROJECT

I have just provided the outlines of competing narrations of devel97. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Jean Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
98. Cf Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW AND HUM.
BEHAV.
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99. See Deborah R. Hensler & Judith Resnik, Contested Identities: Task Force on Gender,
Race, and Ethnic Bias and the Obligations of the Legal Profession, in ETics IN PRACTICE,
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opments of the last century. Of course, the two versions are embedded
in each other, but a debate is ongoing about which theme will become
dominant. As I assess the trends, judging as it is currently understood is
at risk. Despite growing numbers of persons who use the title "judge"
and growing numbers of conflicts called "cases," it is increasingly rare
for state-empowered actors to be required to reason in public about their
decisions to validate one side of a dispute.
One explanation of why discontent with adjudication has begun to
put it into eclipse can be put simply: backlash. Under this analysis, the
increase in access to adjudication had an enormous effect, and those who
felt its power did not like it. Owen Fiss speaks of the availability of
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as creating a "poor
person's FBI." That power to use adjudication to make visible wrongdoing yielded many defendants uncomfortable with the glare of public
inquiries. Some of them had the power to "play for the rules," to borrow
Marc Galanter's now classic explanation of why the "haves come out
ahead.'' Repeat players, with the ability and resources, and now with
the personnel in Congress and in the federal courts, have been able to
limit adjudication because it has proved so effective in curbing those
groups' prerogatives.10 1
I think, however, that a second and more complicated explanation
is required for what has caused the many dents in the adjudicatory
model. My analysis does not rest on adjudication's laurels but rather
questions some of the underlying normative premises of the decades of
developments that I have sketched. The twentieth century built an edifice of adjudication with a thin layer of very well equipped judges at its
top - the life-tenured federal judiciary. The federal rules helped that
group generate its own persona, and over time, that group became a
source of norm production of a sort not much in focus in conventional
discussions of procedure, courts, and constitutional adjudication. Federal judges, in their collective voice, have become advocates for less
judging and less rightsholding.
I have already alluded to one of the apparatuses for socialization:
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a font of normative education, initially schooling federal judges about anti-formalism, access, and
judicial discretion. More recently, these rules have come to focus judges
on curbing lawyers and promoting settlement. The anti-adjudication elements now within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure come in large
100. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1972).
101. As to the need to curb such power, see Owen Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 11. As to
some of the techniques, see Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 12.
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measure from judges themselves. 0 2 Many judges, working in close
proximity with lawyers (and to a much lesser extant with litigants) do
not like the very processes of adjudication with which they work on a
daily basis. Judges have become a major part of the ADR lobby.'°3
Those who have styled judging as a heroic activity"' failed to
focus on the discontent of some of the would-be heroes, who have
rejected the job in whole or part. Further, to the extent some of the
heroes embraced that role, they did so for the "big case" and rebelled at
spending too much time on events they viewed as comparatively trivial.
Moreover, judges came to realize that they could do more than protest
work demands. They could develop legal doctrine and they could work
collectively to influence congressional decisions about the production
and allocation of judicial resources.
As to doctrine, life-tenured judges have permitted the devolution of
cases deemed to be uninteresting to decision makers, often called "hearing officers." Early on in the twentieth century, those individuals were
understood not really to be "judges" but rather government officers of
lower ranks to whom routine tasks were delegated. Further, life-tenured
jurists held the power not only to review but to decide anew jurisdictional facts. 10 5 But, by century's end, the life-tenured judiciary had
come to rely on so many lower tier judges for so much work of a kind
and nature so like what Article III judges were doing that the Court had
to reread Article III to permit devolution of "the judicial power" of the
federal courts to scores of non-life tenured judges."0 6 Thousands of federal adjudicatory decisions are made by these actors, who are located in
agencies and in courts but who lack the constitutionally prescribed
markers of independence and the political and cultural capital that flows
from them.
Further, in terms of activism, the leadership of the federal judiciary
has used the Judicial Conference of the United States as a lobby against
increasing access to federal adjudication for many would-be claimants.
From its creation in the 1920s until the mid-1950s, the judges sitting on
the Judicial Conference (the governing body of the federal judiciary)
took the position that the Conference ought generally not comment on
the wisdom of pending proposals to create new causes of action. But by
century's end, the leadership of the Judicial Conference had moved to
102. Judges have become the dominant participants in drafting and revising the Federal Rules.
See Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CoNmEMP. PROBS. 229 (1998).
103. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 57; Wayne Brazil, A View From the Courts, supra note 73.
104. See, e.g, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 8.

105. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
106. See Resnik, Inventing the District Courts, supra note 22, at 625-43 (detailing the shift in

understanding of the need for life-tenured judges and the doctrinal evolution).
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the front lines - suggesting to Congress not to create rights of access to
the federal courts for certain consumers, for veterans, for victims of violence based on gender.l° 7
Under this approach to federal adjudication, some kinds of claimants gain the privilege of access to the prestigious federal courts and
others are sent to lower level decision-makers. Certainly, and despite
the obstacles, those with economic clout and able lawyers often find
their way into federal court. Moreover, an array of other litigants enjoy
some access to federal court, such as students seeking or opposing
desegregated schools and affirmative action, prisoners challenging conditions of confinement, many mass tort plaintiffs and defendants proceeding in aggregates, and a subset of criminal defendants sentenced
through state processes to long term confinement or to death. Those
litigants become the subject matter of law professors' articles and of
popular narratives. Their problems, identified with federal adjudication,
are readily assumed to constitute "federal cases."
Out of sight (although on the federal docket) are many ordinary
litigants in diversity cases, social security recipients claiming wrongfully
withheld benefits, those defaulting on loans and in breach of or seeking
rights under federal programs. Others, such as battered women (fearful
while sleeping in their homes) or consumers (objecting to health care
provisions) may aspire to become federal rightsholders. Some of those
litigants can be found in state courts, and many are dealt with in low
visibility administrative proceedings over which low status judges preside. These administrative law judges conduct proceedings in rooms
that are hard to find, and render decisions that are not readily made
available through federal law reporters in either the electronic or print
forms.' 0 8 The general public does not have regular means to learn about
what norms are being applied, nor systematic means of checking for
erroneous decisions. 0 9 Further, we cannot use the thousands of judg107. See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 14. at 949-99. See also Judith Resnik, The
ProgrammaticJudiciary: Lobbying, Judging, And InvalidatingThe Violence Against Women Act,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 269 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, The ProgrammaticJudiciary].
108. A major debate in academic and legal circles relates to whether appellate courts must
publish their decisions. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000),
vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 200) (en banc). See generally Lauren Robel, The
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399 (2002). That debate is focused on the production of
decisions by the life-tenured judiciary, and it leaves unaddressed the availability of decisions
rendered by non-life tenured judges in courts and agencies in the federal system.
109. To ascertain how these systems work, on-site empirical studies are required. See, e.g.,
JERRY
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ments to develop new norms through the interaction between legal
regimes and the problems encountered by individuals.
Although the title "judge" has now become attached to many of
these decision-makers, the 61an of "the federal judge" has not. Many of
these judges work in cramped spaces, do not publish opinions, and do
not often see retained lawyers. Further, these judges are sometimes subjected to efforts by agencies to affect their decisions, and increasingly,
agencies are seeking to use employees other than the Administrative
Law Judges commissioned under the APA to render decisions." ° A
contemporary and powerful example comes from recent efforts by the
Attorney General of the United States to treat "immigration judges" as
ordinary employees of the Department of Justice and to subject them to
reassignment at his directive."'
Life-tenured judges have not used their clout in either the roles of
adjudicator or of lobbyist to export their relative material privileges
(larger courtrooms, higher salaries, law clerks, smaller case loads) to
those with fewer resources. Rather, life tenured judges - Warren Burger, famously - have opposed conferring life tenure on these "other"
judges and have insisted on maintaining status hierarchies even as they
support expansion of the roles and responsibilities of non-life tenured
judges.' 2 Indeed, the leadership of the life-tenured judiciary opposed
the suggestion that administrative hearing officers be given the title of
"administrative law judge," and then objected again when magistrates
13
gained the appellation "magistrate judge."'
In short, as the market for adjudicatory services expanded (in terms
of demand and supply) and as it diversified (in terms of the kinds of
disputes eligible for legal resolution, the range of tasks for third parties,
the kinds and quality of processes provided, and the remedies enviPolicy Panel, (Jerry L. Mashaw, James M. Perrin & Virginia P. Reno, eds., 1996); SOCIAL
SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry Mashaw eds., 1988).
See also GENEVRA RICHARDSON
ACTION
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110. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L.No. 106-113, app. C, 124, 113 Stat. 1501A-160
(providing authority for reducing backlog to have Indian Probate decisions made by non-APA
judges); Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN L.
JUDGES 321 (2002); Ann Marshall Young, JudicialIndependence in Administrative Adjudication:
Past, Present, and Future, 38 JUDGES J. 16 (Summer 1999).
111. See Lisa Getter, Response to Terror: Immigration Judges Call for Independent Court,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al. See generally J. Dana Marks Keener & J. Denise Noonan
Slavin, An Independent Immigration Court: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, Position Paper by
the National Association of Immigration Judges (Jan. 2002), at http://www.ifpte.org/federal/pdfs/
Immigration.pdf.
112. See Eric A. Posner, The PoliticalEconomy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
L. REV. 47 (1997).
113. Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 14, at 986-90.
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sioned), choices emerged about which disputes deserved what form of
process. Many of those choices have been left to a small cadre of judges
and lawyers who, in the language of political economy, have a set of
incentives shaped by their own situations. They developed a hierarchy
of adjudicators, and they relegated low status litigants to low status
judges.

The legal academy has also played an important role in influencing
choices about allocating judge services. Scholars assumed that the
"important" lay in the constitutional or in the high profile high value end
of the federal docket. 11 Return for a moment to Goldberg v. Kelly, 15 a
case that Owen Fiss much admires." 6 Recall that Justice Brennan's

majority opinion outlined an adjudicatory model for welfare recipients
who were facing a loss of their very livelihood.1 17 But Justice Brennan
termed the constitutionally required elements - notice, a hearing before
an agency officer, no right to state-paid counsel - to be "rudimentary
due process"' 8: a form of minimal due process that was less than what
a litigant would get were he or she to come to court.

Of course, many of us read Justice Brennan's 1970 opinion as signaling that he hoped, when a majority was willing, to expand the rights
provided. 1 9 But what proponents of Goldberg have failed to appreciate
114. As legal academia itself grew, it focused on and helped to develop an understanding of
the federal judiciary as an elite group. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty
FederalOffenses and the ConstitutionalGuarantyof Trialby Jury, 39 H~Av. L. REv. 917, 980-82
(1926) (arguing that the Constitution does not require Article III judges or juries to determine
"petty" criminal cases, yet disavowing taking a position on whether, as a matter of policy,
Congress should alter its jurisdictional rules). See also Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Federal Police
Courts, with Appendix Containing a Comparative Study of the Criminal Business in the United
States Courtfor the District of Massachusetts in 1913 and 1924, MASS. L.Q. 43, 46-48 (Aug.
1926). Many decades later, Patricia Wald commented on the limited vision of the academy,
unwilling to attend to the range of disputes before the federal courts and the many decisions that
lay outside of constitutional law. See Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Partof the
Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S.CAL. L. REv. 621, 621-22 (1993).
115. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
116. See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 729, 789 (1990); Owen
M. Fiss, The Other Goldberg, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN
VALUES 229 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) [hereinafter Fiss, The Other
Goldberg].
117. 397 U.S. at 266-69.
118. Id. at 267.
119. Specifically, in a paragraph denying recipients counsel as of right, Justice Brennan
explained that the right to cross examine "would be of little avail" without a concomitant right to
counsel. Id. at 269-71. He quoted Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932): "The right to
be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel." Justice Brennan continued, however, by saying:
"[w]e do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but
only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.
Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly
manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interest of the

2003]

THE TRIUMPH AND THE DEATH OF ADJUDICATION

197

is that which could not be delivered by constitutional right had, through
statutes or practices, to be provided. Worse than that, by failing to focus
on administrative adjudication - not in its high profile version but in
the context of low level ordinary disputes - we have tolerated second
class judging rather than finding ways to turn second class judges into
first class adjudicators and to distribute quality adjudication across an
array of institutional providers.
Consider Owen Fiss's commitment to what he has termed the
"instrumental rationality" of judges, 20 a form of disciplined deliberation
captured for him by Hannah Arendt's image of "the soundless dialogue
between me and myself."' '2 Herein lies the justification for the great
powers of judges to act, in the name of the state, to alter peoples' lives
so profoundly.' 2 2 And herein lies the failure to take seriously the need
to equip the administrative state with actors sufficient to do the volume
of adjudicatory work that has been produced by the laws of the administrative state.
Owen Fiss recognized several years ago that bureaucracy was an
inevitable and indeed a desirable aspect of a substantial judiciary.' 2 3
Further, he offered specific suggestions for making bureaucracy work
better to serve adjudicatory ends. For example, he proposed that the
judge who rendered a decision had to be exposed to the underlying problem directly rather than through intermediaries, such as special masters
and staff attorneys, and that judges had to take personal responsibility
for decisions made. 2 4 But while attentive to the demands imposed by
the large institutional reform litigation, neither he nor many others
focused on the dreariness of much of adjudication - on its dailiness, its
ordinariness. Little academic writing attends to judging as a job and as a
social service replete with a host of mundane problems rather than a
feast of exotica.' 2 5 But many individuals seek legal attention for
recipient. We do not anticipate that this assistance will unduly prolong or otherwise
encumber the hearing." Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71.
Justice Black's dissent also interpreted Justice Brennan's discussion as providing the basis for
subsequent decisions finding necessary a right to counsel. See 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J.
dissenting) ("it is difficult to believe that the same reasoning process would not require the
appointment of counsel ... ").
120. Fiss, The Other Goldberg, supra note 116, at 231.
121. Id. at 229, 230 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 185 (1971)).
122. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (examining the
force of law, as contrasted with other forms of interpretation).
123. Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary, supra note 43.
124. Id.. at 1454-57.
125. For example, Justice Scalia has complained that, while once the federal docket was
mostly "exotica" with a touch of the "mundane," it was being taken over by more ordinary cases.
Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National
Council of Bar Presidents, 3, 6 (Feb. 15, 1987). That assessment was, as a factual matter,

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:173

problems related to their employment, their government benefits, their
families, and their safety. And many jurists, some sitting in administrative agencies and others in lower tier state courts, deal day in and day
out with such problems. But absent the aggregation of such claims into
high impact lawsuits, these interactions do not come to the fore within
many academic environments as the prototypical demands for justice.
When responses to such conflicts become less visible, potential
champions for adjudicatory processes are lost. It is commonplace to
note that many who are recipients of welfare do not vote. A few impressive welfare rights movements, spearheaded by recipients, have in fact
been able to reframe legal and political policies. 126 But many recipients
lack the resources necessary to have significant impact. But veterans do
vote. And so do many litigants in diversity cases, and women, in significant numbers. And yet, they are the very constituencies often rebuffed
by the elite lawyers and judges shaping federal rights. 127 Judicial proposals to limit access to the federal courts have become particularly
vivid during William Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice, but its roots
go back to the Warren Court era. 128 Thereafter, under the leadership of
Warren Burger and William Rehnquist, and through both case law and
commentary, the federal judiciary has increasingly placed obstacles to
access for many claimants. Specifically, the Judicial Conference supported the elimination of most of federal diversity jurisdiction and also
opposed proposals to create a variety of new causes of action and to
locate adjudication of certain kinds of extant claims in Article III
1 29

courts.

Of course, choices have to be made to distribute goods and services. But the issue is about who shapes those policies and what understandings guide those decisionmakers. The federal judiciary's approach
has increasingly been to guard its own gates, perhaps serving to create
and to preserve its own special character. But it has not helped to promote broad support for the genre of work so central to its identity. And
poignantly, many people around the world do have aspirations for law to
play a significant role in their daily lives. Consider, for example, the
analysis done by Hazel Genn and her associates at the Socio-Legal Instiinaccurate, as demonstrated by Professor Marc Galanter's comparative assessment of dockets.
See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The FederalCourts Since the Good Old
Days 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 921.
126. The National Welfare Rights Organization is one example. See MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT,

1960-1973 40-45 (1993).

127. See Resnik, The ProgrammaticJudiciary,supra note 107.
128. For details of the changing postures adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United
States, see Resnik, Trial as Error,supra note 14, at 996-82; and Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies,
supra note 12, at 275-81.
129. See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 12, at 224-31; 256-70; 272-81.
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tute at Oxford, England, when asked to inquire about the potential
effects of reforms on civil justice processes there. According to those
researchers, while ordinary individuals believed that law was relevant to
their lives, almost none used court-based processes to remedy the many
problems they had encountered (which ranged from accidental injuries
to disputes with employers, from interactions with the police to monetary disputes). 3 ° Eight out of ten of those surveyed used neither ADR,
nor court, nor sought assistance from an ombudsperson.' 3 1 For such
persons, the two stories - adjudication's triumph and its death - are
both irrelevant because no one has access to courts, or to agencies, or to
ADR. This empirical work reveals that many self-styled "reforms" of
civil processes are not much more than minor variations on the theme,
unresponsive and therefore irrelevant to many disputants who have no
ability to participate in any of the various procedural options.
In short, during much of the twentieth century, an expansionary era
for federal adjudication, national elites of lawyers and judges were proponents of access to federal courts. But, as the composition of those
elites changed, potential beneficiaries of judicial remedies were shifted
to administrative processes that were both less visible and less powerful
in remediating widespread injuries. And those institutions, (and particularly administrative adjudication) are increasingly vulnerable, for they
receive less by way of funding and their jurists have less by way of
structural protection than do Article III judges. While trial lawyers are
currently a major voice for access to courts,1 32 other potential constituencies have not been built through personal positive experiences with
federal adjudication. Opportunities to shape nationally important con133
stituencies for judging have been missed.
Adjudication's proponents in the academy have been a part, sadly,
of the story of adjudication's eclipse. First, by overstating the heroic
proportions of the job of judging, they created expectations that the job
did not often met. As large-scale litigation came to the fore, coupled
130. HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE Do AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW
(1999).
131. Id. at 177.
132. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Common Good's Radical Proposalto Alter the Contingency Fee
System Should Be Rejected (July 18, 2003), available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/
attomey/articles.cfm?ID=10096 (raising objections to limiting the availability of contingency fees
because of the harm to those needing assistance in bringing cases); Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice [need add cite to TLPJ?.
133. In contrast, individuals are gaining the ability to bring claims to major international
juridical institutions, as such tribunals are beginning to permit such direct applications, often after
conditioned on that claimant's exhaustion of national remedies. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, U.N. GAOR, 54th

Sess., Agenda Item 109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (1999).
Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003).
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with the high profile litigation against government or involving large
sums of money, many judges became restless with the ordinariness of
other cases and became reluctant to invest time and resources in them.
Further, judges felt oppressed by the volume of decisions required.
They pressed for faster resolutions to move many cases out of (their)
courts. Second, adjudication's proponents have failed to export its
heroic aspects of the activity to the ordinary judges, to the presiding
officers, the hearing officers, the administrative judges, who deeply
affect the fabric of the lives of so many, whether by deciding questions
of benefits for veterans and social security recipients or by dealing with
those seeking protection of rights as employees, consumers, or contracting parties. Adjudication's supporters need to return to their claims
for adjudication and ask how adjudication can be refashioned to deliver
its promises more broadly.

